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# INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE EU_15: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

## Abstract:

In 2015, the so-called migration crisis culminated in Europe. Although immigration can bring along many benefits (labor force, cultural diversification), it constitutes a challenge for fiscal policy if immigrants fail to integrate. This paper examines the level of integration in the EU_15 on the data from Eurostat in period 2009 to 2018. The results show that immigrants who were not born in the EU_28 were significantly worse off in terms of the unemployment rate and the risk-of-poverty rate than the host society. Immigrants born in the other EU_28 country were not significantly worse off on the labor market, but the at-risk-of-poverty rate was significantly higher in comparison with the host society. The data didn't confirm that share of immigrants with tertiary education (both from the EU_28 or outside the EU_28) was significantly lower than the share of the tertiary educated population in the host society. The level of integration of immigrants did not got worse after the migration crisis. Furthermore, the results showed a considerable difference in the degree of integration between EU_15 countries.

## Keywords:

immigration, economic integration, social integration, refugees, European Union

**JEL Classification:**  F22, F29, F50

**Introduction**

Immigration and asylum issues are currently among the most debated issues at European and national level. Immigration, along with the emerging industry and the colonial past of many European states, used to be welcomed in several European countries where foreigners have complemented the lack of labor supply. Labor immigration caused subsequent immigration waves in the form of family reunification. The growing number of immigrants brought about problems related to the integration of ethnic minorities into majority companies. Eventually, oil shocks in the 1970s caused stagnation in economies and the associated decline in labor demand.

Immigration is inevitable nowadays. According to Sachs (2016), the movement of people from areas with low productivity of labor into areas of high productivity of labor is a key stimulus for migration. Migration leads to changes in the profitability of production factors (capital and skilled and unskilled labor). Productivity disparities can be reduced by social or economic reforms, but a certain productivity gap remains irreversible. Governments cannot suppress migration because of the duty to accept refugees and to allow family migration. Rejecting these types of migration would lead to the inhibition of human rights by developed countries. Another reason of unavoidable immigration is an illegal migration, which has not yet been fully averted.

Governments must, therefore, balance between a humanitarian responsibility and their own economic and social needs. The existence of highly developed welfare states complicates maintaining this balance. With the need to minimize the negative phenomena associated with migration (for instance rising state spending, terrorism, crime, and others) and maximize the benefits associated with migration (an increase of labor force, cultural diversity), the importance of integration policies is growing. This constitutes a reason for analyzing the topic of this article.

Integration should be a dynamic, two-way process of interconnecting foreigners and residents of the host country. The output of integration can be measured by social and economic conditions, education, health, housing etc. The most important part of integration is the employment of immigrants since the foreigner contributes visibly to overall society through this channel. Increasing immigration to Europe entails an increasing pressure on the functionality and adequacy of integration policies not only at the European Union's level but also at the national level. However, the host country cannot influence the level of integration fully. The result of the process of inclusion of immigrants is determined by many determinants such as individual factors of immigrants, general politics and context of a given country and by mentioned integration policies.

The aim of this article is to answer the question if the integration of immigrants in the EU_15 has been successful or not. The aim of the theoretical part is to clarify the terminology used for describing the level of integration of immigrants and identify determinants of the success of integration. The public policy aiming to smooth integration of immigrants influences the final level of immigration only partly, and it is therefore of high importance to describe other factors which come into play. The following, practical, part provides analysis which is done using data from Eurostat. Since the integration of immigrants is a long-term process, average values over one decade were calculated. The tables in this part display calculations of the averages of time series data from 2009 to 2018. The selected period covers the era before, during and after the migration crisis as well. Therefore, general statements about the level of integration of immigrants among EU_15 can be drawn. Differences between selected indicators describing the host society and the population of immigrants are used for assessing the level of integration. The change in level of

integration of immigrants before and after the crisis is analyzed for each indicator too. The analysis leads in the comparison and evaluation of the overall level of integration of immigrants in the EU_15.

## 1    Literature Review

Research on migration began in the 20s and 30s of the 20th century at the Chicago School (Bosswick, Heckmann, 2006). The research of migration has two basic areas: immigration policy and integration policies. Although they differ in their focus, they should be in a complementary relationship (Bourhis, 1999). These areas of research tend to observe mainly at the national level. However, it is important to control their correct setting and enforcement at the regional and local level too. In addition, the importance of examining these policies at the global level is growing nowadays. This article is concerned about the national level of inclusion of immigrants.

The process of integrating immigrants can be viewed from a micro-sociological or macro-sociological perspective. From a micro-sociological perspective, the integration of immigrants relates to individual processes. Immigrants are actors with their own goals, the decision to integrate into society is the result of individual choice. From a macro-sociological perspective, the inclusion of immigrants refers to the overall results that describe the relationship between a group of foreigners and domestic population in each country. This article will analyze the integration of immigrants from the second perspective.

### 1.1    Terminology

Several sociological and economic studies (Hersi, 2014; Berry, 1997; Bourhis et al. 1997 and others) dealt with the definition of the basic terms describing the outcomes of the inclusion of immigrants. The four basic outputs of inclusion of immigrants were defined by Berry (1997). Table 1 lists these outputs based on two criteria concerning the preferences of immigrants and their communities. The first and oldest concept is an assimilation. Heisler (1992) states that Milton Gordon defined the assimilation as a diverse process beginning with acculturation (the acquisition of language, religion, and other cultural characteristics), continuing structural integration (establishing relationships in a society, lack of discrimination and prejudices) until final assimilation. Heisler (1999) criticizes this concept for the unilateralism of the outlook when the process of adaptation depends primarily on the personality of the immigrant.

Secondly, a separation occurs when the immigrant denies a dominant culture, avoids any contact with the majority society and preserves its own culture. Thirdly, a situation where neither group has any interest or opportunities for interaction is called a marginalization. This possibility is rare in practice, and it is often a result of forced assimilation (Berry, 1997).

The last possible output is an integration. Shadid (1991: 362) defined the integration as "the participation of ethnic and religious minorities, individually or as groups, in the social structure of the host society, while retaining the distinctive aspects of their culture and identity." Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) divide the integration further into a structural integration (allowing immigrants to enter the labor market and a housing market, an access to education and benefits flowing from the welfare state,  right to attain citizenship), cultural (adopting a new culture while preserving its own culture, the so-called biculturalism), interactive (an admission of a foreigner into the social ties) and identification (identification with the country's institutional objectives). The integration is according to Berry (1997) the most successful, the least successful are marginalization and assimilation.

**Table 1 Strategies of inclusion of immigrants**

| | | Is it considered valuable to preserve your own identity and cultural characteristics? | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | YES | NO |
| **Is it considered valuable to maintain contacts with the majority company?** | YES | Integration | Assimilation |
| | NO | Separation/segregation | Marginalization |

*Source: own illustration based on Berry (1997)*

The so-called multiculturalism is another widely used term in the context of migration research with a focus on the European Union. According to Kymlička (2010), multiculturalism is an attempt to build an inclusive democratic society, to prevent racial segregation and discrimination, to ensure equal opportunities and to accept ethnic pluralism. In fact, however, multiculturalism has failed. For example, Manning (2010) conveys the widely accepted belief that multiculturalism has sparked controversy and separation of cultures and ethnicity rather than creating the intended unity through mutual respect and tolerance. Bloemraard (2006) examined the inclusion of immigrants in the example of Australia. He points out that Australia, as a country that has previously promoted the concept of multiculturalism, now adapts itself to the so-called laissez-faire system of immigrant integration, as in the United States of America. Erdal and Oeppen (2013: 869) argue that *"integration has been used as a middle ground between multiculturalism and assimilation as it focuses on full participation of migrants in the labor market and their formal citizenship, cultural preferences open to personal choice".*

Integration policies that reflect pluralism will most likely produce a positive and harmonious output than assimilation (Bourhis et al., 1997). For these reasons, integration has been selected for this paper as a desirable output, and the indicators are indicative of it.

### 1.2    Determinants of integration of immigrants

The success of immigration of foreigners is conditioned by several factors. Their identification is particularly important from two points of view. First, it determines to what extent the government can influence the results of the integration process. The second point follows the previous one. Factors that cannot be addressed by integration policies should play a role in deciding on the setting of immigration policy. In a simplified form, immigrant integration determinants can be divided into three sets of factors.

**Immigrant populations and individual factors:** The composition of the population of immigrants is shaped by many factors (history, geography, migration policy). Migration factors are demographic (sex, age, family status, number of family members, citizenship, country of birth, length of residence etc.), and socioeconomic (education, employment, income, occupation, level of development of the country of origin, language, size of the city, proximity to city center etc.) (Carmon, 1981; Huddleston, Niessen, Tjaden 2013). Carmon (1981) shows the positive effects of the following factors: the size of the city, the low number of family members, the low age, the so-called white-collar occupation, the residence near the city center, and the increasing length of

stay. According to his research, economic integration has no connection with integration in social and cultural spheres. Group vitality (meaning its demographic structure and international prestige) is also significant. The group's vitality influences the strength of the incoming group towards the host (Bourhis et al., 1997). Several studies show that acceptance of identity of the host society positively contributes to deepening integration (for more information read Battu, Zenou, 2009; Manning, Roy; 2010).

**General policies and country context:**  This set of factors considers diverse national contexts. Macro-level factors and their correlation with the results of the integration of immigrants are generally less well known than individual factors (Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden 2013). Broadly speaking, they include labor market structures and economic growth, education system, state's welfare level, housing market, and public opinion. As has been said, the high level of state welfare can have a negative impact on the integration process (Spencer 2006; Sachs 2016). Bosswick and Heckman (2006) emphasize that the options offered by the market economy depend on the economic cycle, so they cannot be considered as constant. The capacity for integration evolves with economic fluctuations.

**Migration and integration policy:** Integration policies include a variety of instruments and measures, in form of support for the labor market integration, business-related policies, suppression of discrimination, promotion of education, professional and language skills, support for housing and provision of healthcare for ethnic minorities. Migration and targeted integration policies are difficult to analyze as factors explaining the success of the integration of immigrants through limited data comparability. The link between policies and results is not always direct, it is hard to be proved and interpretable. However, in a situation where the state cannot fully decide on the admission of immigrants and refugees based on some selected criteria, integration policy is the only instrument to facilitate the integration of immigrants and mainly refugees. If integration fails, the potential of human capital is lost (Kogan, 2016). As has been already said, the marginalization or segregation then put pressure on public budgets, threats social cohesion and confidence, and increase the likelihood of terrorism and crime.

## 1.3    Empirical research into the success of the integration of immigrants

Most empirical studies address the success of the integration of immigrants in the labor market. Algan et al. (2010) examined the degree of integration of foreigners into the labor market in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Foreigners are getting worse on the labor market (measured by unemployment and net income), both the first and the second generation of immigrants. The authors have failed to demonstrate the clear link between policies and the degree of integration achieved. Contucci and Sandell (2015) investigated integration on the example of Spain. According to their results, foreigners have full integration into the labor market, while social integration is significantly failing. Barslund et al. (2017) have done research on Austria, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. They were focused only on Bosnian immigrants. The results show that it took one decade to integrate Bosnians in Germany and Sweden. The worst level of integration among these countries was in Denmark due to low support at the labor market. Kogan (2016) put the question if the integration policies for support of inclusion in the labor market were effective in the European countries. She concludes that: *"Our results ascertain that policy intentions are not automatically translated into successfully*

*implemented policies in terms of comprehensive coverage, nor are they necessarily effective and lead to more advantageous labor market positions for immigrants."* (Kogan, 2016: 353)

Berry (1997) predicts an overall integration time pattern in the "U curve" shape. Few problems with entering the country are followed by a number of complications in the near future and by ultimately a positive outlook over the long term.

## 1.4    Conclusions from literature review and hypotheses

The following hypotheses for this article have been identified based on the literature review. First, it was illustrated that integration policies have only limited influence on the success of integration. Immigrants are supposed to reach statistically significant worse results than people born in a reporting country (in all indicators). Secondly, as the EU_15 (and other European countries) were hit by immigration wave in 2015, the level of integration of immigrants is likely to be at a lower level than before the crisis since integration is a long-term process. This hypothesis is also in line with results of the presented results of selected studies. Thirdly, social integration is at a worse level than labor market integration (as Contucci, Sandel, 2015). Fourthly, immigrants from non-EU countries are supposed to show worse results, because this immigrant population is significantly different from the European population and therefore individual factors will play a larger role. Migration within the EU_28 is often motivated by work (due to the free movement of people in the EU_28) and this is a prerequisite for better integration. In addition to these hypotheses, differences in the success of the EU_15 integration will be discussed, and the question will be whether the allocation of quotas corresponds to the success of integration in these countries. The length of stay between immigrants in the EU_15 is differentiated and each of the immigrants is likely to be in another part of the "U-curve".

## 2    Methodology

Based on the literature review, indicators used by the study of OECD (2012) and the availability of comparable data, we suggest the following indicators of the success of immigrant integration in three spheres:

Labor market integration: Unemployment rate

Social integration: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion

Educational integration: Tertiary education attainment

The results of all three spheres can be connected since a labor market integration is influenced by the level of education of immigrants and the level of labor market integration and level of education of immigrants lead in better or worse social integration. However, Carmon (1981) denied this connection (mentioned earlier) and Contucci and Sandel (2015) proved poorer social integration that economic integration in the case of Spain. For this article, the latter hypothesis is supposed.

Countries of the EU_15 were selected as countries for research in this paper since most of the quotas for the division of immigrants in the EU_28 are located to the EU_15. Even though the United Kingdom is supposed to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom belonged among the countries of the EU_15 and the national integration policies can be potentially exemplary for other countries if the level of integration will be assessed as a success. Indicators are provided in

the division by country of birth since the country of birth shapes immigrant population and individual factors which cannot be (as was discussed earlier) influenced by the host country. People born in the reporting country are compared with immigrants born in the other country which is a member of EU ("born in EU_28 except reporting country") and with immigrants born in the third country ("not born in EU_28"). Integration will be marked as successful if immigrants achieve comparable results as the population born in the reporting country. Firstly, average values are calculated for all indicators over the 10 years' time period. Secondly, the differences between domestic and foreign population are calculated and verified using a paired t-test (showing if the difference is statistically significant or not). For the unemployment rate and the at-risk-of-poverty rate, a one-tailed t-test is used. A two-tailed t-test if used in case of the share of the tertiary educated population. Finally, values for 2014 and 2018 are shown to illustrate the change in the differences between host and foreign population before and after the immigration wave.

The chosen methodology does not make it possible to distinguish the length of stay of foreigners in the given territory. The Eurostat provides data in the division by citizenship, but these data do not allow to investigate the level of integration of immigrants who have already gained the citizenship of the host country.

## 3    Results and discussion

Table 2 provides information about the size of the immigrant population in EU_15. Averages are calculated only for the second half of chosen period since Eurostat doesn't dispose with longer time series. The largest share of the foreign-born population was in Luxembourg (81.98 %), Austria (22.02 %), Ireland (19.72 %) and Belgium (19.39 %) in 2017. The relatively lowest immigrant group lived in Finland (6.43 %), Portugal (9.25 %) and Italy (10.85 %).

Table 2 also shows the division of refugees for reallocation from Italy, Greece, and Hungary as a part of the European Commission's proposal for dealing with migration crisis released on the 9th September 2015. The key for the division of refugees reflects by 40 % the size of GDP, by 40 % the size of the population, by 10 % the average number of past asylum applications, and by 10 % of the unemployment rate.

**Table 2 Size of domestic and immigrant population and refugee quotas, 2014-2018**

| Country (EU-15) | Born in the reporting country | Born in the EU_28 except for the reporting country | Not born in the EU_28 | The share of foreign-born population (%) | Refugee quotas |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 7 108 197 | 707 999 | 857 036 | 22.02 % | 3 640 |
| Belgium | 9 458 415 | 862 490 | 971 683 | 19.39 % | 1 600 |
| Denmark | 5 071 815 | 215 607 | 416 549 | 12.46 % | - |
| Finland | 5 146 599 | 117 837 | 213 081 | 6.43 % | 2 398 |
| France | 58 615 179 | 2 183 667 | 5 799 716 | 13.62 % | 24 031 |

| Germany | 69 871 094 | 4 599 877 | 6 757 689 | 16.26 % | 31 443 |
| Greece | 9 564 145 | 344 945 | 906 496 | 13.08 % | - |
| Ireland | 3 950 204 | 592 579 | 186 466 | 19.72 % | - |
| Italy | 54 727 592 | 1 824 968 | 4 110 890 | 10.85 % | - |
| Luxembourg | 316 547 | 194 769 | 64 725 | 81.98 % | 440 |
| Netherlands | 14 922 472 | 557 607 | 1 514 265 | 13.88 % | 7 214 |
| Portugal | 9 471 717 | 237 743 | 638 703 | 9.25 % | 3 074 |
| Spain | 40 519 389 | 1 966 817 | 4 031 461 | 14.80 % | 14 931 |
| Sweden | 8 176 755 | 529 931 | 1 163 872 | 20.71 % | 4 469 |
| United Kingdom | 56 516 326 | 3 305 748 | 5 680 830 | 15.90 % | - |

*Source: own composition and calculations based on data from Eurostat (2019): Population on 1 January by age group, sex, and country of birth and European Commission – Press release (2015)*

### 3.1    Integration in the labor market

Integration of immigrants from other EU_28 countries in the labor market was on average very successful in the selected period. The differences between indicators for people from reporting country and people born in the other EU_28 country are not statistically significant. In France, Germany, United Kingdom and Portugal, the unemployment rate was even higher than for the host society. A considerable gap between unemployment rates could be seen in the case of Spain (5.65 p.p.), Denmark (3.62 p.p.), Italy (3.26 p.p.) and Belgium (3.12 p.p.). These results show that one of the factors which motivates migration inside the EU_28 are job possibilities.

On the other hand, the difference between the unemployment rate of domestic society and population born out of the EU_28 is highly statistically significant. The unemployment rate of immigrants not born in the EU_28 was higher than the unemployment rate of host society in all EU_15 countries. The level of integration in the labor market was very diverse among the EU_15. The gap was the largest in Belgium (14.85. p.p.), Sweden (13.48 p.p.), Finland (11.70 p.p.) and Spain (11.53 p.p.), the lowest in United Kingdom (2.36 p.p.), Ireland (2.57 p.p.) and Germany (2.99 p.p.). The immigrants from third countries had higher rate of unemployment in comparison with domestic population and population from other EU_28 countries in all selected countries.

The level of integration in the labor market did not worsen after the immigration crisis, otherwise, integration of immigrants from other EU_28 countries and other countries than EU_28 improved (see Table 4).

**Table 3 Integration in the labor market, average values (%, 2009-2018)**

| Country (EU-15) | The reporting country | Born in the EU-28 except for the reporting country | Difference (p.p.) | Not born in the EU-28 | Difference (p.p.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | 4.21 | 7.11 | 2.90 | 11.95 | 7.74 |
| **Belgium** | 6.21 | 9.33 | 3.12 | 21.06 | 14.85 |
| **Denmark** | 5.77 | 9.39 | 3.62 | 13.46 | 7.69 |
| **Finland** | 7.90 | 10.49 | 2.59 | 19.60 | 11.70 |
| **France** | 8.71 | 8.27 | -0.44 | 17.69 | 8.98 |
| **Germany** | 4.61 | 3.95 | -0.66 | 7.60 | 2.99 |
| **Greece** | 20.04 | 23.03 | 2.99 | 28.97 | 8.93 |
| **Ireland** | 10.93 | 13.47 | 2.54 | 13.50 | 2.57 |
| **Italy** | 10.05 | 13.31 | 3.26 | 14.12 | 4.07 |
| **Luxembourg** | 3.88 | 5.70 | 1.82 | 13.31 | 9.43 |
| **Netherlands** | 5.00 | 6.73 | 1.73 | 11.62 | 6.62 |
| **Portugal** | 11.66 | 11.37 | -0.29 | 16.15 | 4.49 |
| **Spain** | 19.16 | 24.81 | 5.65 | 30.69 | 11.53 |
| **Sweden** | 5.77 | 7.38 | 1.61 | 19.25 | 13.48 |
| **United Kingdom** | 6.17 | 5.46 | -0.71 | 8.53 | 2.36 |
| **EU_15** | **8.74** | **11.06** | **2.32(-)** | **17.28** | **8.54(***)** |

*Source: own composition and calculations based on data from Eurostat (2019): Unemployment rates by sex, age and country of birth (%) Note: (-) p-value equal to 0,33901; (***) p-value equal to 0,00120. Values for foreign population in Germany are calculated only as the average of the last two years since Eurostat does not provide longer time series.*

**Table 4 Integration in the labor market (%, 2014 and 2018)**

| Year | The reporting country | Born in the EU-28 except for the reporting country | Difference (p.p.) | Not born in the EU-28 | Difference (p.p.) |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| **2014** | 9.8 | 12.8 | 3.0 | 19.2 | 9.8 |
| **2018** | 6.9 | 7.0 | 0.1 | 12.6 | 5.7 |

*Source: data from Eurostat (2019): Unemployment rates by sex, age and country of birth (%)*

### 3.2    Social integration

Social integration in the EU_15 is significantly less successful than the integration in the labor market both regarding immigrants from the EU_28 except reporting country and immigrants from other than the EU_28 country (Table 5). In average, immigrants from other EU_28 country face a higher risk of poverty (by 4.21 percentage points). The result is statistically significant at 5 % significance level. The level of social inclusion is different among the EU_15. The at-risk-poverty rate is lower for immigrants from EU_28 in comparison with the host society in Portugal, United Kingdom, and Germany. On the contrary, population born in the other EU_28 country face the worst living conditions in France (difference 19.68 p.p.), Spain (17.20 p.p.), Austria (14.34 p.p.), and Italy (13.64 p.p.). The risk of poverty is dramatically higher in the case of immigrant not born in EU_28, their at-risk-of-poverty rate is almost doubled in comparison with the host society. The social integration is going badly mainly in Belgium, where the gap between the host society and immigrants from third countries counts for 35.43 p.p. The social integration is poor also in Greece (29.40 p.p.), Spain (28.39 p.p.), Luxembourg (26.61 p.p.), Sweden (25.97 p.p.) and Finland (25.02 p.p.). The gap is low only in Portugal (6.83 p.p.). The share of immigrants from the third countries at the risk of poverty was higher in comparison with domestic population and immigrants from other EU_28 countries in all selected countries.

The values for the EU_15 have to be calculated because Eurostat does not provide this data. The values were weighted by the number of inhabitants of each category. The risk of poverty or social exclusion has not worsen after the migration crisis (see Table 6).

The findings are in line with research of Contucci and Sandell (2015), the level of social integration is significantly worse than the level of labor market integration.

**Table 5 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad group of country of birth (population aged 18 and over, %, 2009-2018)**

| Country (EU-15) | The reporting country | Born in the EU-28 except for the reporting country | Difference (p.p.) | Not born in the EU-28 | Difference (p.p.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | 14.19 | 28.53 | 14.34 | 36.60 | 22.41 |
| **Belgium** | 16.62 | 25.69 | 9.07 | 52.05 | 35.43 |
| **Denmark** | 17.28 | 26.18 | 8.90 | 38.16 | 20.88 |
| **Finland** | 16.52 | 19.71 | 3.19 | 41.54 | 25.02 |
| **France** | 15.80 | 20.67 | 19.68 | 35.58 | 19.68 |
| **Germany** | 19.74 | 16.87 | -2.88 | 30.30 | 10.56 |
| **Greece** | 30.56 | 39.36 | 8.80 | 59.96 | 29.40 |
| **Ireland** | 24.80 | 25.96 | 1.16 | 37.21 | 12.41 |
| **Italy** | 25.51 | 39.16 | 13.64 | 44.72 | 19.21 |
| **Luxembourg** | 12.22 | 18.9 | 6.70 | 38.83 | 26.61 |
| **Netherlands** | 13.71 | 19.14 | 5.43 | 33.82 | 20.11 |
| **Portugal** | 24.21 | 20.55 | -3.66 | 31.04 | 6.83 |
| **Spain** | 22.73 | 39.93 | 17.20 | 51.12 | 28.39 |
| **Sweden** | 13.86 | 20.88 | 7.02 | 39.83 | 25.97 |
| **United Kingdom** | 17.28 | 19.26 | -1.19 | 32.92 | 12.48 |
| **Weighted average** | **20.23** | **24.45** | **4.21(\*\*)** | **38.32** | **18.08(\*\*\*)** |

*Source: own composition and calculations based on data from Eurostat (2019): People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad group of country of birth (population aged 18 and over) Note: "The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people with an equivalized disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalized disposable income after social transfers."(Eurostat, 2019). (\*\*\*) p-value 0,01013 and p-value 0,00000*

**Table 6 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad group of country of birth (population aged 18 and over, %, 2014 and 2017)**

| Year | The reporting country | Born in the EU-28 except for the reporting country | Difference (p.p.) | Not born in the EU-28 | Difference (p.p.) |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| **2014** | 20.96 | 26.24 | 5.28 | 39.29 | 18.33 |
| **2017** | 19.66 | 23.23 | 3.57 | 37.73 | 18.07 |

*Source: own calculations based on data from Eurostat (2019): People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad group of country of birth (population aged 18 and over). Note: Eurostat does not dispose with data on the risk of poverty rate for all countries in 2018.*

## 3.3    Educational integration

The level of educational attainment can constitute the determinant of integration as well as the output of integration. If the immigrants entering the country has attained a tertiary level of education (it means at least short-term tertiary studies to doctorate level) before the immigration, there is a higher chance of getting a job and learning a new language if the official language of the host country is different. Unfortunately, data does not show where the education has been completed. However, the smaller the gap in educational attainment is, the better is either quality of human capital of immigrants or the better is the inclusion in the educational system in the host country.

Differences between the shares of the tertiarily educated population are not statistically significant for both categories of immigrants (Table 7). However, the share of the population with tertiary education varies significantly across the EU_15. The immigrants from EU_28 except reporting country are better educated than population born in host society in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece and Italy. The educational level of immigrants born in the EU_28 except reporting country is significantly lower in comparison with the host society in Luxembourg (18.60 p.p.), Denmark (16.74 p.p.) and Portugal (15.45 p.p.).

Surprisingly, the share of immigrants with tertiary education is on average higher than the share of the host society which has finished tertiary education. A huge variance between countries of the EU_15 is obvious. The share of immigrants from the third countries with tertiary education is significantly higher mainly in Greece (-11.71 p.p.), Finland (-9.28 p.p.), Spain (-8.14 p.p.), Finland (-9.28 p.p.) and Netherlands (-7.73 p.p.). The relatively lowest share of immigrants not born in the EU_28 with tertiary education is in Ireland (29.81 p.p.), Luxembourg (18.14 p.p.), and United Kingdom (12.07 p.p.).

The gap between the host society and foreign population decreased after the immigration wave (Table 8).

**Table 7 Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and country of birth (%, 2009-2018)**

| Country (EU-15) | The reporting country | Born in the EU-28 except reporting country | Difference (p.p.) | Not born in the EU-28 | Difference (p.p.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | 23.88 | 33.90 | 10.02 | 18.39 | -5.49 |
| **Belgium** | 35.09 | 34.70 | -0.39 | 27.04 | -8.05 |
| **Denmark** | 32.92 | 49.66 | 16.74 | 33.65 | 0.73 |
| **Finland** | 39.27 | 29.84 | -9.43 | 29.99 | -9.28 |
| **France** | 30.61 | 25.85 | -4.76 | 27.05 | -3.56 |
| **Germany** | 27.91 | 26.30 | -1.61 | 23.45 | -4.46 |
| **Greece** | 25.88 | 24.26 | -1.62 | 14.17 | -11.71 |
| **Ireland** | 36.70 | 46.5 | 9.80 | 66.51 | 29.81 |
| **Italy** | 15.49 | 13.30 | -2.19 | 12.99 | -2.50 |
| **Luxembourg** | 28.40 | 47.00 | 18.60 | 46.54 | 18.14 |
| **Netherlands** | 32.77 | 36.61 | 3.84 | 25.04 | -7.73 |
| **Portugal** | 17.31 | 32.76 | 15.45 | 26.31 | 9.00 |
| **Spain** | 31.90 | 32.44 | 0.54 | 23.76 | -8.14 |
| **Sweden** | 35.47 | 39.25 | 3.78 | 36.30 | 0.83 |
| **United Kingdom** | 36.42 | 43.63 | 7.21 | 48.49 | 12.07 |
| **EU_15** | **26.97** | **30.65** | **3.68(-)** | **26.57** | **-0.40(--)** |

*Source: own composition and calculation based on data from Eurostat: Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and country of birth (2019). Educational levels 5-8. Note: (-) p-value 0,17111, (--) p-value 0,87600*

**Table 8 Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and country of birth (%, 2014 and 2018)**

| Year | The reporting country | Born in the EU-28 except for the reporting country | Difference (p.p.) | Not born in the EU-28 | Difference (p.p.) |
|------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| **2014** | 27.3 | 32.4 | -5.1 | 27.8 | -0.5 |
| **2018** | 30.0 | 32.3 | -2,3 | 28.1 | 1.9 |

*Source: data from Eurostat: Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and country of birth (2019).*

## 3.4    Synthesis

To sum up, significant differences in the level of integration of immigrants in the current EU-15 could be seen. Countries can be divided into four categories with respect to the differences between indicators for immigrants and reporting country. Countries were divided into the groups (marked by colors) on the base of similarity of results.

Firstly, we are comparing countries in terms of the first two analysed indicators (the unemployment and the risk of poverty), since the level of attainment of tertiary education is not fully determined by the hosting country. Secondly, all three indicators are used for comparison of countries. The results are divided by the group of immigrants too. The summary of comparison is shown in the Table 9.

Key findings are as follows. The order of countries by level of integration was almost the same if the tertiary education is included or excluded. Luxembourg was performing worse in terms of educational integration and on the other size, Greece was performing better when the share of tertiary educated people is added.

With focus only on the integration in the labor market and social integration (first three columns), it can be stated that mainly France and Sweden were not able to integrate the immigrants from third countries on the same level as the immigrants from the EU_28 countries. On the other hand, Italy and Denmark were relatively better in the integration of immigrants from third countries in the selected period.

If we include the share of people with tertiary education, the integration of immigrants from third countries was relatively worse in Luxembourg and Sweden and it was better in Austria, Italy and Denmark (relative to the level of integration of immigrants born in the other EU_28 country).

The highest overall level of integration of immigrants was attained in Germany, United Kingdom, Portugal, France and Ireland. The success of United Kingdom, Ireland and Portugal ca be determined by the colonial past of these countries. The success of Germany and France could be determined by the social system and integration policies in these countries. The worst overall level of integration of immigrants could be seen in Spain, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg.

**Table 9 Evaluation of level of integration across the EU_15**

| Overall score | Integration of immigrants born in the other EU_28 country | Integration of immigrants from third countries | Overall score with tertiary education | Integration of immigrants born in the other EU_28 country | Integration of immigrants from third countries |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | United Kingdom | Germany | Germany | Germany | Germany |
| United Kingdom | Germany | United Kingdom | United Kingdom | France | United Kingdom |
| Portugal | Portugal | Ireland | France | United Kingdom | Italy |
| Ireland | France | Portugal | Portugal | Finland | Portugal |
| France | Ireland | Italy | Netherlands | Portugal | Netherlands |
| Netherlands | Netherlands | Netherlands | Finland | Netherlands | Ireland |
| Italy | Sweden | Denmark | Ireland | Sweden | Austria |
| Finland | Finland | France | Italy | Ireland | France |
| Luxembourg | Luxembourg | Austria | Greece | Greece | Greece |
| Sweden | Greece | Finland | Sweden | Italy | Finland |
| Denmark | Austria | Luxembourg | Austria | Luxembourg | Denmark |
| Austria | Belgium | Greece | Denmark | Belgium | Spain |
| Greece | Denmark | Spain | Belgium | Austria | Belgium |
| Belgium | Italy | Sweden | Spain | Spain | Sweden |
| Spain | Spain | Belgium | Luxembourg | Denmark | Luxembourg |

*Source: own evaluation based on the previous Tables*

## Conclusions

Research in this article showed that the topic of integration is still an important issue for the EU_15. The theoretical part of this work presented the basic terminology associated with the output of immigrant integration and integration was designated as a targeted form of inclusion of immigrants. Furthermore, the determinants of immigration were analyzed to show that integration policies have only a limited impact on the outcome of integration.

Using the results of the analysis, the hypotheses were evaluated as follows. The integration of immigrants born in the other EU_28 countries has been successful. The possible reasons are (i) European institutions facilitate the free movement of people, (ii) relative cultural and religious homogeneity, (iii) long period of economic growth in the selected time series. The integration of immigrants not born in the EU_28 countries in the labor market is not successful since the unemployment rate is higher by 8.54 percentage points (highly statistically significant difference). Even though the share of people with tertiary education within immigrants from third countries is not low, the structure of labor supplied by immigrants do not probably match labor demanded. The other reason can be non-recognition of education and certificates awarded by institutions from countries outside the EU_28. The social integration was a failure according to 2009-2018 data. Immigrants born in EU_28 except reporting country face higher at-risk-of-poverty rate by 4.21 percentage points, immigrants not born in EU_28 face higher at-risk-of-poverty rate by 18.08 percentage points. These values are alarming since they constitute a serious burden for a state budget.

Second hypothesis was not confirmed, the level of integration of immigrants did not worsen after the migration wave. The third hypothesis about the worse level of social integration relative to the integration in labor market could not be denied.

The fourth hypothesis also could not be denied. Immigrants born in the other country than the EU_28 country reached worse results on the labor market and in case of risk of poverty, but the surprising finding is that the share of immigrants from the third countries with tertiary education was even higher than the share in the host society.

The results show huge diversity between the EU_15 countries. The integration can be assessed as successful in Germany, United Kingdom, Portugal, France and Ireland. Vice versa, the worse level of integration can be seen in Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg and Austria. If the refugee's quotas from September 2015 could be corrected upon the level of integration, more refugees should be reallocated to Portugal, United Kingdom and Ireland and fewer refugees should be reallocated to Spain, Austria and Sweden.

The limitation of the conducted analysis constitute possibility for further research. The chosen methodology does not leave space for in-depth analysis of selected countries. However, the identification of the most successful countries is important since these countries can be used as an example for other countries. We recommend analyzing all three sets of determinants of integration (migration policies and individual factors, general policies and context and integration policies) to assess why integration of immigrants is successful just in these countries. Upon results of such analysis, policy implications for deepening of integration can be drawn.

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