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THE ROLES OF RISK GOVERNANCE ON ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEMS

Abstract:

The role financial institutions sector in economic activities with higher capitalization ratio have the impact to alleviate credit and market risks including measuring in loan-to-deposit ratio. Good risk governance cannot be denied when the failure of financial systems does not exempt the Islamic financial institutions. Some of the recent examples for the collapses of Ihlas Finance House of Turkey, the Islamic Bank of Africa, Dubai Islamic Bank and Investment Companies of Egypt. The failure of financial market in OECD countries demonstrate Islamic banks are not much different from conventional banks. Another issues raised in this paper is the financial crisis which reveals risk-related issues resulted from mismanagement of risk at organizational level including various stakeholders. The aim of this paper is to discuss the significant roles of risk governance as the mediating variables between the risk management initiatives and the banks corporate performance. Early empirical study define risk management as a process which managers capabilities identifying and mitigate risk. There are vast reason of explaining the necessity of governance to avoid risk-related failure of financial marketis due to systems complexity and high risk exposures. The risk governance concept is founded from the agency theory, stakeholder-based governance theory, and delegated monitoring theory. The stakeholder based governance present the ideas whereby banks need to provide multiple benefits relationship include customer, supplier, distributors and employees. This research explores the secondary data relevant to analyze the risk governance effects of the 50 international Islamic banks between the periods of 2008-2013. The necessary statistical testing was explained for hypothesis testing and the model development. The expected outcome from the analysis is to tightened the construct to ensure level of risk monitoring is sufficient, minimizing moral hazard and prompt corrective action framework by incorporating the elements of corporate governance.

Keywords:

Financial Risk Management; Corporate Governance; Risk Governance; Islamic Banking

JEL Classification: G38

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The need for effective risk governance cannot be denied, in reference to the cases of the collapsed of several Islamic financial institutions as the Ihlas Finance House of Turkey, the Islamic Bank of Africa and Investment Companies of Egypt (Ali, 2007). Nevertheless, the nature of the causes and consequences of the failure of financial market in OECD countries demonstrated that Islamic banks are different from conventional banks. The recent case of major bank failure is the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers in mid September 2009 (Flannery, 2009).

The Islamic financial market has been phenomenal in some parts of the world. Economic growth in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Malaysia has shown a remarkable in market conditions especially on the aspect of monetary growth. Sound economic growth aligned with progressive government projects has not only able to maintain but to sustain the GCC and Malaysia financial sectors. For the GCC, high oil price, large fiscal and trade surpluses, and government vast financial reserves have allowed this region's states to maintain stable economic growth of their gross domestic productivity (GDP). The studies by Matoussi and Grassa, (2012) confirm that, banking industry in GCC is closely linked to oil export as this commodity has been pivotal since 1940s. Oil revenues were the main driver behind GCC economic growth. In supporting the fact, in 1970s there are numerous of foreign banks have expanding their operations in the GCC countries. In this respect, the some of the pioneer Islamic banks developed in GCC were Kuwait Finance House (incorporated in 1977), Dubai Islamic Bank (established in 1975), Al-Rahji Bank (registered in 2006) and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (operating since 1983). Today, total population of GCC countries is around 49.8 million in 2013 as compare to 33.2 million in 2004 (IMF, 2014). Recent turbulence in GCC essentially by external economic environment such as financial crisis, food crisis and partly from domestic reforms.

Being the country with 60.4 % with Muslim population would essentially propel the Islamic banking in Malaysia to significant heights. According to World Bank (2014) Malaysia population increase 29.79 million in 2012 to 30.26 million in 2013. Study conducted by Haque (2010) has discussed first phase of development of Islamic bank in Malaysia started as soon as the establishment of Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) in July 1983 and Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad (BMMB), was established on 1 October 1999 under the Islamic Banking Act 1983 when Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd managed to present Islamic financing as a model suitable both for Muslims and non-Muslims after the financial crisis in 1897. Malaysia established its High Level Finance on Corporate Governance in 1998, following on from the drastic downturn of the Malaysian economy in 1997. Malaysian Code of Risk Governance was announced by the Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia Central Bank) which became to be effective on 2012. The Code divided into three parts (i) overview and risk governance guidelines (ii) 13 principles of risk governance (iii) implementation policy (BNM, 2013).

Motivation of the Study

Although Islamic bank in GCC countries is quite remarkable in terms of its growth, however, after global financial crisis and European debt crisis, Islamic banks signaling alarming condition of its profits since these countries badly affect by regional crisis. Hence, there is an issue in managerial expectation on risk governance and bank performance.

a) Low and declining trends of Islamic Banking Performance

The return on average assets (ROA) is commonly used in measuring profits against the assets mobilised by a bank for generating profits. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. reveals the performance of Islamic banks in Malaysia and GCC. These figure shows that both return on average assets and return on average equity experience decline capacity during global financial crisis between 2008-2009. Definitely, most of Islamic bank demonstrate inability to generate income due to unfavorable economic condition. The difference of ROA is used an indicator to measures bank efficiency, whereas ROE reflect bank leverage. ROA and ROE is a concern primarily for bank otherwise bank cannot run their business at a sufficient return on equity if they hold to much equity capital. Holding large amount of debt capital is not the solution because debt does not absorb losses and can introduce more risk into the equation. The long term survival of banks is to maintain high amount of equity capital complement with prudent risk management.




Figure 1.1 : Return on Average Asset (ROA)¹




Figure 1.2 : Return on Average Equity (ROE)²

¹Sources: Bankscope, author analysis of selective banks

²Sources: Bankscope, author analysis of selective banks

There were many researchers believes that credit risk affect bank performances. It is proven that the failure of banks monitoring loan growth activities and directly involved with asset-backed securities and derivative product causes by credit risk (Lepetit, 2012). This is because credit risk causes by human behaviour; that is people make decision. The decisions that that they make are consequences of their incentives and incentives of the shareholders whom they represent. The existence of of credit risk and bank's lending activities occur once individual select any Islamic bank to invest in. Money deposited at banks generate credit risk if regulators frequently shut down banks, which can lead to losses for their clients. To understanding what motives are shareholders and managers is important aspect of a counterparty credit risk profile.

b) Increasing Trends of Risk Governance on International and Conventional Financial Systems

Year	Risk Governance Key Milestone
September 2005	<p>Important milestone events to the introduction of risk governance influences over the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) in Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>This independent organization has developed:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) harmonize the concepts of risk governance, (ii) anticipating major risk issues, (iii) providing risk governance policy advice for key decision-makers, (iv) identifying 13 risk management factors affected the risk governance and (v) principles of 'good governance'.
February 2009	<p>Ortwin Renn published his book "Risk Governance: Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World", which provide additional insights of Risk Governance Framework.</p> <p>There are five consecutive phases proposed in Risk Governance Framework:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) pre-assessment (ii) appraisal (iii) characterization and evaluation (iv) management (v) communication
August 2011	<p>Risk Governance Index being proposed by Sujatha Vaidun Vidyadhar and Martin Hovey effective on 28 August 2011.</p>

November 2012	Central Bank of Malaysia launched Guidelines on Risk Governance effective on 23 November 2012.
March 2014	Risk Governance Framework at micro and macro level introduced by Alexander Cedergren and Henrik Tehler.

Table 1.1: Risk Governance Key Milestone

Table 1.1 highlighted risk governance milestone. In recent studies, Cedergren and Tehler (2014) developed risk governance framework at micro and macro level. They point out differences risk governance from positive and normative approaches. A Risk Governance Index (RGI) being introduced by Vidyadhar and Hovey (2011) capture the behaviour of board and its influences on company performances. Elements of this risk governance index, were assigned as (i) company's risk stance and risk appetite (ii) risk policies and procedures (iii) risk culture (iv) strategy in risk management (v) risk committee (vi) stress testing and scenario analysis (vii) training of directors (viii) risk reporting and disclosure (ix) chief risk officer (CROs). Therefore, our aim in this research is to further develop risk governance index. The existing risk governance index failed to provide how score range translate into concern for each of these elements. The important element that being developed does not properly fit for the risk governance under the landscape of Islamic banking. The key question for policymakers is how to develop mechanisms to avoid this risk. Such criticisms ultimately drove academics into introducing measures of this research will suggest an improvement in RGI.

Theoretical Foundation

In Islamic finance, agency theory takes into consideration the transparency to its investment holder. Bank shareholders act as principal and managers as an agent. Agent will exercise control over investment decision based on profit and loss of the bank (Iqbal, 2008). We infer that agency theory also exist in Islamic banking. Shamsuddin and Ismail (2013) acknowledges that Islamic agency (*wakalah*) relationship between agent manager (*mudarib*) and investor or borrower. Agency theory takes into action when principal is only concerned about profit or return whilst agent benefited from compensation. There is also empirical evidence that, agency theory in Islamic banking based on several fundamental of corporate governance (Hasan, 2012).

The adoption of stakeholder based governance theory is a response to complexity and changes in agency theory. The origins of stakeholder's theory have been found by Adam Smith (Freeman, 1984). Thus, the diffusion literature provides Fontrodona and Sison (2006) emphasizes that bank not only have to offer just kind of good or services but also to distribute it fairly. As according to stakeholder-based governance theory, there are multiple relationships when it include customer, supplier, distributors and employees (Al-Shamali, Sharif & Irani, 2013). For instance, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011) proposed assumptions holds of stakeholder-based governance theory (i) stakeholder have rights to participate in decision making process (ii) managers have fiduciary duty to serve the best interest of stakeholder (iii) objective of the firm must benefited all party not only shareholders.

The main ideas of stakeholder based governance theory are exposed theoretical concept in Islamic finance has been introduced by Iqbal and Mirakhor since 2004. The standard of stakeholder theory for Islamic model are different from Anglo-Saxon, European model, Japanese model, Latin model or even Confucion model while the aim of Islamic models is to maintain and promote principles social justice not just to shareholders but to the stakeholders. Confirming past research on these topics, Tse (2011) reviews some benefits and problems of stakeholder and shareholder after financial crisis. This paper identifies three advantages of stakeholder theory. First, it create fair value towards internal and external stakeholder. Second, good relationships linking stakeholder and management. Thirdly, the advantages issues related to improvement in decision making process. Shareholders have ability to involved with corporate governance process. Board responsible to develop strategic plan for bank to ensure bank profitability.

Risk Management and Bank Performance

Risk management in Islamic banks is not different from conventional bank. Islamic bank has to follow guidelines made by Financial Services Board (IFSB) in terms managing risk. These risks were included credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, foreign exchange risk, mismatch risks and interest rate risk (Karim & Archer, 2013). The goal of risk management is controlling risk when qualitative and quantitative assessment of risk exists. Proper financial risk management can increase value of bank and hence shareholder values. Buzzwords such as risk management must be oversight by bank professionals to ensure awareness of risks embedded in the balance sheets and off balance sheets of banks (Bessis, 2011).

Risk management mechanism of banks established in two categorized (i) internal risk management and (ii) external risk management (Crouhy, Galai & Mark, 2014). Internal risk management is about management process, structure and policy should comply with regulations and provide clear decision making and accountability. Internal risk management critical for senior management and boards of directors who responsible for carefully processes for identifying, assessing and managing risk. Internal risk management include bank specific variables (Pugliese, Minichilli & Zattoni, 2014). To evaluate internal risk management various measurement were used including credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk. External risk management is about demand for disclosing internal risk management to the outsider. Investors, financial analysts, external stakeholders, suppliers, customers and regulators, demand for disclosing risk externally. The literature done by Hassan and Kayed (2009) reveals that risk management in Islamic finance is sharing the risk between the borrower and lender with the fixed interest income. There are two process of risk management by *Shariah* point of view (i) negative *Shariah* screening and (ii) positive *Shariah* screening. Risk management from Islamic perspective prohibited any *gharar* transaction and does not involved with complex derivatives activities. Siddiqi (2009) document that risk management in Islamic framework should be risk sharing between financiers and producers, debt not traded, free from interest rate practices, funds raise through equity and business not allow to involved with high risky project.

Corporate Governance and Bank Performance

Obviously, Al-Jarhi (2006) states that in Islamic finance, good corporate governance allows depositors to have some influences in decision making process since banks and financial institutions received funds from these investors. The involvement of investor in decision making process reduces risks of failure besides promotes profits. Contrary, conventional banks give utmost attention to the speculative activities; such as gambling and highly risky investment project portfolio. Absent of interest, some author, McNeil et al., (2005) argue that risk management elements should be embedded in a corporate governance. There were cumulative of study support the implication of Corporate Governance (CG) on banks performance. Theoretically, corporate governance is divided into two perspectives which are external governance and internal governance. Both governances have greater and special attention to ensuring the stability of the banking system. Within the internal bank management such as management, board or director, employees, internal audit, remuneration committee, board independent play an important roles. External governance consists of statutory and contractual provisions that determine the costs of active shareholder participation in the management process. At the same time as external corporate governance mechanism, represent by the regulation, regulator, external auditor, credit rating, and accounting standard.

In line with this, Dedu and Chitan (2013) study internal corporate governance and bank performances for Romanian analyze with fixed effects model (FEM) and pooled least squares. In order to perform a valid test, data were collected from Bucharest Stock Exchange from 2004-2011. Result revealed that internal corporate governance (ICG) negatively influence banking performances (ROA, ROE, Z-score). Ideally, this research have introduce internal corporate governance index (ICGI). Highlighting, experienced managerial board (MB) improve bank performances (ROA, ROE).

Risk Governance in Banking Sector

This study links the two strands of literature by investigating the influences risk governance and modern financial institutions were highlights in Scandizzo (2013). The key findings above mention, all stakeholder consist of shareholder, depositor, government, bondholder that will bear the risk, only shareholders earns profits. Therefore, the scholars believe it is important to determine the linkages of risk management and corporate governance interrelated. In fact, failure of financial institution severe real economy for consequences generation.

While according to Bassens, D., Derruder, Witlox, B.F. (2011) in their research, studied on 253 scholars in 212 Islamic Financial, suggest institutions to identify the role, power and specialties' of *Shariah* boards on Islamic financial services. They used interlocking directorates' methodology with the theory that inter-firm interlocks reflect actual flows within and between cities through the movements of *Shariah* board scholars. The internal variable that influence the study are the *Shariah* board memberships and movement of *Shariah* scholars. They found that, well connected Gulf cities and mainstay financial centres outside Middle East are networked by interlocking board memberships.

Given the increased importance of risk governance Xue Wang's (2010) took the initiative for comprehensive research, increased disclosure requirements and corporate governance decisions with the evidence from chief financial officers (CFO) in the pre (1998-2001) and post (2002-2005) Sarbanes-Oxley Periods. These results show that

CFOs of firms with strong internal controls receive higher compensation and do not experience significant changes in forced turnover rates. While, CFOs with weaker internal controls receive lower compensation and experience higher forced turnover rates after the passage of Sarbanas-Oxley Act (SOX). The analytical framework used in this study is based on the difference-in difference research design revealed compensation variables such as salary, bonus and total compensation. The actual impact of control variables was measured by regressing stock market returns, firm size, age and tenure of executive officers. He also measured the executive turnover variable.

Research Framework

This study is an effort to identify the factors that currently affect Islamic banks performance. Proposed conceptual framework for this study details in Figure 1.3. The dependent variables of banks performance is influenced by the two independent variables; risk management and corporate governance. The two independent variables are also interrelated as explained through risk governance.

In these research, we formulate the risk management model to examine the relationship between the Islamic banks performance using the set of internal and external banking characteristics. Internal risk management is evaluated by analyzing financial ratios which formed as credit risk, operational risk and liquidity risk. While external risk management are best measure by GDP growth rate, central bank lending rate and inflation rate. An important indicator in comparing corporate governance and Islamic bank performances would be address in the relevant internal and external corporate governance. The relevant internal corporate governance describes as total number of CEO meeting, board size and total number of internal audit meeting. In regards to external corporate governance variables which includes investigating external audit meeting, accounting standard and number of credit rating.




Figure 1.3: Developed Framework for Research

Research Methodology

In this study, Bankscope database and annual report will be the source for quantitative data collection. Bankscope database was chosen to minimize the bias arising from accounting practice and accounting standard. There are 36 financial ratios available in Bankscope which can be compared across banks and countries (Pasiouras, Tanna &

Zopounidis, 2005). We conduct our balance panel data analysis on a micro data set of established and emerging Islamic banks: Malaysia and GCC countries. Information of bank financial statement and annual report is gathering from Bank-scope over 28 banks for the period 2006-2012.

The following Table 1.2 provides insights into the development of variables definition and notation signify the measurement considered in this study. On examining Islamic bank's performance, we will be analyzed on the basis of some restricted variables as follows:-

Variables	Description	Formula	Indicator	Sources
1. Endogenous Latent Variables (Bank Performance)				
ROA	Return on Average Assets	$\frac{\text{Pre-tax profits}}{\text{Average Assets}}$	Bank Performances (BP)	Bank scope
ROE	Return on Average Equity	$\frac{\text{Pre-tax profits}}{\text{Average Equity}}$	Bank Performances (BP)	Bank scope
PM	Profit Margin	$\frac{\text{Net Income}}{\text{Total Operating Income}}$	Bank Performances (BP)	Bank scope
2. Mediating Variables (Risk Governance Variables)				
CRO	Chief risk officer	Total number of Chief Risk Officer	Risk Governance (RG)	Annual Report
RCM	Risk committee members	Total number of Risk committee members	Risk Governance (RG)	Annual Report
SC	<i>Shariah</i> members	<i>Shariah</i> composition	Risk Governance (RG)	Annual Report
3. Internal Risk Management Variables (Exogenous Variables)				
LLP	Loan Loss Provision	$\frac{\text{Loan Loss Provision}}{\text{Gross Loan}}$	Credit Risk	Bank scope

CAR	Capital Adequacy Ratio	<u>Total capital</u> (Capital and Current Account)+ 50% (unrestricted investment account)	Operational Risk	Bank scope
TDR	Total Deposit Ratio	<u>Total customer deposits</u> Total funding	Liquidity Risk	Bank scope
4. External Risk Management Variables (Exogenous Variables)				
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	Real Gross Domestic Product (%)	Macro-economics	World Bank
CBLR	Central Bank lending rate	Interest rate charge by Central Bank to private sector	Macro-economics	World Bank
INF	Inflation Rate	CPI annual % change in the basket of goods and services in specified year.	Macro-economics	World Bank
5. Internal Corporate Governance Variables (Exogenous Variables)				
CEO	CEO meeting	Total CEO meeting per year	Corporate Governance	Annual Report
BS	Board Size	Total Board composition	Corporate Governance	Annual Report
REM	Remuneration meeting	Total of board remuneration meeting per year	Corporate Governance	Annual Report
6. External Corporate Governance Variables (Exogenous Variables)				
EA	External Audit	Total number of external audit meeting	Corporate Governance	Annual Report
AS	Accounting Standard	1=comply with AAOIFI standard 0=otherwise	Corporate Governance	Annual Report

RR	Credit Rating	Total number of subscribes credit rating agency	Corporate Governance	Annual Report
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Table 1.2: Descriptive of the variables

Four steps that usually taken in validation of structural equation modelling are: specification, identification, estimation, and evaluation and modification. Based on agency theory, stakeholder-based governance theory, and delegated monitoring theory has been designed for this research (Figure 1.4). This formative model posits a composite variable that summarize the common variation in a collection of indicators.




Figure 1.4: Proposed Path Diagram in SEM

Secondary data collection were extracted from Bankscope, annual report and audited financial statement from respective banks during data collection process. The reason for selecting annual report as the data collection source is due to the credibility of the annual report, easily assessable. Bankscope database was chosen to minimize the bias arising from accounting practice and accounting standard. As mention previously mixed method design are conducted in this study. Data analysis technique that will be used in this research is the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM).

Conclusion

There is no coherent and significant answer whether the sub-prime crisis may have direct effect to the banking system in GCC and Malaysia. This raises the question of whether Islamic banks performance can survive when there is turbulence in international financial markets. It may have an impact but how big risk governance effect toward Islamic banks in these country will require an attempt to explain the shortcomings.

This study is important since there are increasing risk governance application in Islamic banks for cases in Malaysia and GCC. The increasing of roles and expectations on the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) who is responsible to oversight risk governance practices is another factor to consider. The elements monitor events affecting clients' performance on an ongoing basis, regardless of whether or not they are meeting the obligations.

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